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Software industry is adopting a scalable microservice architecture at increasing
pace. At the advent of 5G, this introduces major changes for the architectures
of telecommunication systems as well. The telecommunications software is mov-
ing towards virtualized solutions in form of virtual machines, and more recently,
containers. New monitoring solutions have emerged, to efficiently monitor mi-
croservices. These tools however can not provide as detailed view to internal
functions of the software than what is possible with tools provided by an operat-
ing system.
Unfortunately, operating system level tracing tools are decreasingly available for
the developers or system administrators. This is due to the fact that the virtual-
ized cloud environment, working as a base for microservices, abstracts away the
access to the runtime environment of the services.
This thesis researches viability of using Linux kernel tooling in microservice mon-
itoring. The viability is explored with a proof of concept container providing
access to some of the Linux kernels network monitoring features. The main focus
is evaluating the performance overhead caused by the monitor.
It was found out that kernel tracing tools have a great potential for providing low
overhead tracing data from microservices. However, the low overheads achieved
in the networking context could not be reproduced reliably. In the benchmarks,
the overhead of tracing rapidly increased as a function of the number of processors
used. While the results cannot be generalized out of the networking context, the
inconsistency in overhead makes Linux kernel monitoring tools less than ideal
applications for a containerized microservice.
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Ohjelmistoala on yha¨ suuremmassa ma¨a¨rin siirtyma¨ssa¨ skaalautuvien mikropal-
veluiden ka¨ytto¨o¨n. 5G:n saapuessa myo¨s tietoliikenneja¨rjestelmien arkkitehtuu-
reissa na¨hda¨a¨n suuria muutoksia.Tietoliikenneja¨rjestelma¨t ovat muun ohjelmis-
toalan mukana siirtyma¨ssa¨ virtualisoituihin ratkaisuihin, kuten virtuaalikoneisiin
ja viimeisimpa¨na¨ kontteihin. Uuden arkkitehtuurin myo¨ta¨ palveluiden valvon-
taan on syntynyt mikropalveluihin erikoistuneita tyo¨kaluja. Na¨ma¨ tyo¨kalut eiva¨t
kuitenkaan pysty kilpailemaan ka¨ytto¨ja¨rjestelma¨n tarjoamien tyo¨kalujen kanssa
valvonnan yksityiskohtaisuudessa.
Valitettavasti ka¨ytto¨ja¨rjestelma¨tason valvontatyo¨kalut ovat arkkitehtuurimuu-
toksen takia harvemmin ohjelmistokehitta¨jien ja ylla¨pita¨jien ulottuvilla. Suuri
syy ta¨ha¨n on se, etta¨ mikropalveluarkkitehtuurin myo¨ta¨ palvelut on virtualisoitu
pilveen. Ta¨llo¨in pa¨a¨sya¨ palvelun suoritusympa¨risto¨o¨n ei usein ole.
Ta¨ssa¨ tyo¨ssa¨ tutkitaan, onko Linux-ytimen valvontatyo¨kalujen hyo¨dynta¨minen
mikropalveluiden valvonnassa kannattavaa. Kannattavuutta tutkitaan kontis-
sa ajettavalla monitoriprototyypilla¨, joka tarjoaa pa¨a¨syn osaan Linux-ytimen
verkonvalvonta-ominaisuuksista. Tutkimuksen pa¨a¨paino on selvitta¨a¨ monitorin
vaikututus ajossa olevan ja¨rjestelma¨n suorituskykyyn.
Tutkimuksessa selvisi, etta¨ Linux-ytimen valvontatyo¨kaluilla on optimitilanteessa
mahdollista kera¨ta¨ mikropalveluiden tilaan liittyva¨a¨ valvontadataa ilman suurta
vaikutusta suorituskykyyn. Epa¨suotuisassa tilanteessa valvonnan vaikutus nousi
kuitenkin merkitta¨va¨sti. Verkkovalvonnan suhteellisen vaikutuksen havaittiin kas-
vavan laskentakuormaan ka¨ytettyjen prosessorien ma¨a¨ra¨n funktiona.
Tuloksia verkkovalvonnasta ei voi suoraan yleista¨a¨ verkkovalvontakontekstin ulko-
puolelle. Valvonnan vaikutuksen kasvun vahva riippuvuus ka¨ytetyn isa¨nta¨koneen
ominaisuuksista kuitenkin tekee Linux-ytimen valvontatyo¨kaluista epa¨ideaalin
ratkaisun mikropalveluiden valvontaan.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For any modern service, receiving accurate and timely information about how
the software is functioning is crucial. From operation and administration
perspective, the information about systems health is necessary to keep a
service running.
The rapid adaptation of the microservice architecture and distributed
cloud computing has introduced a major challenge to application monitoring
and debugging. The cause for this is the vast increase in the scale and
complexity of the services. The services which were once powered by a single
database and a java monolith, may now run in thousands of containers and
multiple data centers. The inevitable consequence of this transition is that
actual deployment environment has been automated and abstracted away
from the operations personnel.
New types of tools, such as ELK stack [20] and Prometheus [48] have
emerged for collecting application specific logs and metrics from distributed
systems. However, the lower level operating system assisted debugging tech-
niques such as profiling and tracing have not kept up with the advance.
Monitoring and debugging tools have not all managed to keep up with
the transition to microservices. Need for the information provided by these
tools however has certainly not decreased.
At the same time, the monitoring toolkit of the Linux kernel is under
constant development. Each new version offers more sophisticated tooling
than the previous. The tools like Perf, eBPF and XDP are under active
development and can be used to do very fine-grained instrumentation of
running processes. While the tools offered by the Linux kernel are focused on
gathering information in the scope a host rather than a service, information
provided can still be useful in full scale microservice context.
1
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1.1 Problem statement
5G cloud introduces a challenging monitoring environment, where the tech-
niques traditionally used for monitoring the mobile networks will be inad-
equate for the task. This is due to the fact that the techniques are not
applicable to the microservice architecture as such. In a similar fashion,
the monitoring solutions used for microservices cannot completely fulfill the
requirements of the 5G Cloud Radio Access Network.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore modern Linux kernel monitor-
ing, tracing and debugging utilities and to evaluate their applicability in the
context of 5G microservice architecture. In practice, this is done by imple-
menting a containerized monitor microservice. The goal of this service is to
provide access to some of the monitoring and debugging tools provided by
Linux kernel, which has been lost in the architecture change.
1.2 Scope and methodology
In the context of microservice monitoring, scope of the implementation is
restricted to network monitoring and selective mirroring of the monitored
data. Network monitoring has been a relevant monitoring and debugging
mechanism as long as networked computers have existed. In this thesis,
specific target for monitoring is the HTTP protocol. This is due to the
popularity of HTTP as a communication protocol between microservices.
The focus in the context of kernel tooling is eBPF. This is due to its
flexibility and active development. eBPF enables doing the necessary packet
analyzing and the mirroring decision solely in the kernel. This makes it
attractive tool for selective packet mirroring performance-wise.
From the container perspective there are multiple focus points. The most
important one is the required configuration for running the eBPF based mon-
itor inside a container. The configuration challenges include researching the
possible dependencies to the host kernel and the security challenges intro-
duced by the monitor. The other important aspect of containers is that in
addition to the monitor, the monitored applications are run in containers as
well. Important part of the container context is to address the complications
rising from the network namespacing.
The performance overhead of the implemented monitor is tested by run-
ning network traffic benchmarks with and without the monitor. The overall
impact of the monitor is then measured from the differences observed in the
monitored and non-monitored benchmark.
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1.3 Contribution
The author implemented an eBPF based network monitor for microservices
and benchmarked the performance overhead of the monitor. It was found out
that kernel tracing and monitoring tools have a great potential for providing
low overhead tracing data from microservices. At the best case, performance
overhead for network monitoring benchmarks was around 5%. However the
overhead of tracing rapidly increased as a function of the number of pro-
cessors used. The performance impact at the worst case was nearly 80%.
While the results cannot be generalized out of the networking context, the
inconsistency in overhead puts Linux kernel monitoring tools at a serious
disadvantage, when compared with readily available microservice monitoring
tools.
1.4 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 discusses the background topics of the thesis. The emphasis on
this chapter is providing insight on software monitoring, 5G and microser-
vices. Chapter 3 discusses tools used in the thesis. The focus of the chapter
is in containers and Linux kernel tools for tracing and monitoring. Chap-
ter 4 covers the implementation details of the network monitor and the test
setup constructed around it. The network monitor part discusses the pro-
gram logic of the monitor and the technologies used in the implementation.
The test setup part describes the tools, both software and hardware, used for
benchmarking the implemented monitor. Chapter 5 presents the results of
the benchmarks and configuration. In Chapter 6 the results and their impli-
cations are discussed. Chapter 7 summarizes the implementation, obtained
results and the discussion.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides basic information about the topics of this thesis. First
the telecommunications environment and its relationship to the virtualiza-
tion and microservices are discussed. After that, there is an introduction to
microservice monitoring and network monitoring tools and concepts.
2.1 Telecommunications environment for mon-
itoring
5G comes with unprecedented technical requirements for the infrastructure.
According to a survey conducted by Agiwal et al. [1], average user is expected
to download a terabyte per year by 2020 via mobile networks. These forecasts
can be seen in the requirements for supporting up to thousand times higher
data volumes[56]. Most of this increase is expected to be originating from
multimedia streaming. The eight core requirements for the 5G are:[1]
• 1-10 gbps data rate
• 1ms round trip time
• high bandwidth per unit
• enormous number of connected devices
• 99.999% availability
• 100% coverage
• almost 90% reduction in energy usage.
4
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 5
• high battery life
Besides the data rate, the requirement for ultra-low latency demands
architectural change for the mobile networks. The sub millisecond latencies
set a strict upper bound for the distance. Just the time light spends travelling
in an optic fiber sets the maximum distance to around 100km. When the
inevitable processing delays and possible network congestion is considered,
the actual maximum distance will be a fraction of the 100km [54]. The
implication of this is that applications requiring this level of latencies cannot
be provided by a big data center possibly multiple hundreds of kilometers
away from the user.
The edge cloud is a concept, which aims to move the computing closer
to the user. This is done by having cloudlets between the user and the
centralized cloud environment. According to the Satyanarayanan, the author
of the term [51]
A Cloudlet is a trusted, resource-rich computer or cluster of com-
puters that’s well-connected to the Internet and available for use
by nearby mobile devices.
The solution is therefore to migrate the latency sensitive applications from
the centralized cloud environment to the cloudlets running at the edge of the
cloud. In the context of the mobile cloud computing, this is referred to as
multi access edge computing (MEC). MEC is promised to provide capabilities
for providing services directly at radio access network (RAN) edge [26]. This
way, services with ultra-low latency can be provided without ever passing the
traffic to the core network. Additionally, the services running at RAN edge
may take advantage the edge context, and provide context, such as location,
aware services [56].
Besides the edge cloud, virtualizing the mobile network infrastructure is a
major ongoing process. the systems which used to run on top of specialized
hardware, are now being moved to general purpose hardware on top of a
virtualized layer [50]. There is multiple motivations for the virtualization.
Arguably one of the most important features offered by virtualization is the
flexibility with resource allocation.
An example use case to show case the benefits of virtualization in the
telecommunications infrastructure is the virtualization of base band units
(BBU). In the pre 3G world the BBUs were integrated to the base stations
(BS) along with the remote radio units (RRU). Transition towards 4G first
separated the BBU from RRU in 3G and in 4G the BBUs were moved to
a centralized BBU pool and service multiple RRUs. In the Cloud Radio
Access Network architecture, the BBU pool is virtualized and can be run
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with general purpose hardware. In this case, the benefits of virtualization
enable moving the BBUs from the radio sites to a centralized location, which
reduces the costs. Furthermore, the load for each cell can have large variation
as a function of the time of the day. The virtualization enables scaling the
BBUs up and down as a reaction to the load, further increasing efficiency.
2.2 Service Monitoring
Software monitoring used to revolve around statically configured tools, such
as Nagios, monitoring certain metrics. The base for these metrics is usually
low-level usage metrics, such as memory, CPU and disk usage. Additionally,
these metrics include application type specific polling of metrics to deter-
mine the health information. For example, in the web context this is polling
is often done to some statically defined urls. The health of the system is
then determined using some predetermined thresholds for the metrics. These
methods are effective, given that the set of monitored applications remain
static. With the adaptation of containers and microservice architecture, the
once static resources changed to dynamic ones. Running instances of con-
tainerized services may be short lived by their nature and be rapidly moved
from one host to another as a reaction to the events in the environment.
Because the statically configured tools do not handle the highly dynamic
services well enough, new branch of monitoring tools specifically designed
for dynamic configurations emerged. Examples of this kind of tools are the
ELK stack [20] and Prometheus [48]. The work flow for these dynamic tools
is follows. The first stage in the data generation is some unit included in the
container itself which is responsible for collecting and emitting a metric. in
ELK, these collectors are referred to as beats. These metrics are then parsed
to uniform format and inserted to a centralized database. In ELK stack
this parsing is done by Logstash and elastic search works as the database.
The data is then visualized by a frontend, which in ELKs case is Kibana.
The advantage of including the metric collectors in the containers is, that
no configuration changes are required per newly launched container, as they
automatically upload their metrics to the log collector service. Even though
the configuration is significantly lighter than with the static tools, every type
of service will still need a custom log emitter and log parser.
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2.3 Network monitoring and data mirroring
Network monitoring has been popular tool as long as networked applications
have existed. The network traffic analysis is widely used for example as a part
of intrusion detection system, gathering analytic data or diagnosing behavior
of a service for debugging purposes.
The network monitoring and especially traffic mirroring is always a trade-
off between performance and the sophistication of the filtering applied. With
no filtering, the data can be mirrored for example at router level with low
overhead using technologies like Cisco SPAN [59]. On large systems, this
kind of unfiltered mirroring however produces huge amount of data. Storing
or moving all network traffic for centralized analysis may be unfeasible for
being too expensive or even impossible.
The other extreme is capturing the data from an endpoint in user space
using for example libpcap [57]. This approach allows for arbitrarily complex
filtering logic bounded only by available computational resources and is a
widely used especially for network related debugging. However, the filtering
and processing overhead can often be undesirably high.
Multiple solutions have been proposed for handling the load [4] [17][42].
Common for all the approaches is the usage of libpcap to gather the (mostly
unfiltered) data and then filter it and pass it further to usually centralized
analysis. For handling the load itself, Zhao et al. [60] have proposed a solution
based on submitting the data gathered via libpcap to a distributed message
queue, which is able to process the large data volume. In a similar fashion,
Laboshin et al. [38] propose mirroring the data to a computing cluster to
be analyzed via (map-reduce) big data tools. Outsourcing the processing
of network traffic to an external computing cluster has local overhead too.
Any node in the network from which the traffic is captured, must process
the packets at least to the extent of forwarding them to another interface.
In practice however, the solutions using libpcap for capturing the packets
need to pay the computing cost of copying each packet to the user space.
In case of using for example a distributed message queue as the next step,
encapsulation of the packets needs to be done as well. While the computing
cost per packet might not be high, the cost starts to be significant, when
the link speeds rise from less than gigabit per seconds to 10G or even 40G.
Bonelli et al. [4] focus on solving the computational cost in the capture end.
They propose a modified version of libpcap which is capable fanning out the
packets to multiple cores. This does not reduce the processing time needed
by the network capture but is nonetheless useful especially in case of high
networking throughput and multiple available cores.
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Network monitoring on the host systems is not the only way for capturing
the relevant traffic between the microservices. The other solutions include
for example forwarding the traffic through a proxy and instrumenting the
monitored applications themselves for the purpose. As an example of a proxy
based approach Erlacher et al. [21] proposed a TLS traffic sniffing proxy for
monitoring encrypted network traffic. The caveat of this kind of proxy based
approach is that the proxy needs to be configured for use for all applications
and it introduces a single point of failure for the applications.
Examples of a solution which instrument the application themselves are
Zipkin [62] and Jaeger [32]. The advantage of this solution is that much
information regarding the context of the data can be included by the appli-
cation and if needed, the data can be filtered without significant overhead
on the fly. These tools also include sophisticated methods for tracing the
requests trough a distributed system. The caveat of this approach is that
each application needs to support the instrumentation. At least for the most
popular http frameworks though, the effort for adding the instrumentation
Zipkin for Jaeger is low, as the instrumentation is usually readily available
via plugins.
Chapter 3
Tools
This chapter introduces tools used this thesis. The first part of the chapter
is dedicated to introduction to the container technology. The second part
discusses monitoring tools provided by the Linux kernel.
3.1 Containers
Containers are an operating system level virtualization technology. Instead of
virtualizing whole operating system, containers leverage the isolation features
of the an operating system itself to provide the containerized service an
isolated view of the system. When compared to the virtual machines the
containers have the advantages of being more lightweight, allowing for much
faster startup times and greater density per host [50].
In the Linux, the isolation required by containers is provided by names-
paces, cgroups and seccomp policies. Cgroups allow grouping processes and
limit the resources available for the groups [8]. Seccomp on the other hand
limits system calls available for the process [52]. The isolation can be further
enhanced by mandatory access control such as SELinux [53] or AppArmor [2].
Linux namespaces allow the processes running in a namespace to have their
own isolated view of a global system resource. Currently there is 7 available
namespace types [39].
• CGroup namespaces provides isolation for the cgroup hierarchy. Every
namespace has their separate root for the hierarchy.
• IPC namespace isolates inter process communication channels pro-
vided by the kernel. For example, POSIX message queues.
• Network namespace provides isolated view of the kernel network stack,
9
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including for example interfaces and iptables rules. The network names-
pace is discussed further in the section 3.1.1.
• Mount namespace is used to isolate the mount points visible to a
process [41]
• PID namespace isolates the view to the Linux kernels process table.
This means that the namespaced processes will have no information
about the processes outside their own namespace. A process not in the
host namespace will have different PIDs depending on the namespace.
The first process in a PID namespace will always the init process (pid
1) for the namespace. This init process has some special properties.
For example, it will receive no signals from its namespace for which it
has not set a handler. This means that it cannot be killed by its peers
in the same namespace, regardless of their privileges, unless explicit
signal handler is provided. Another special property of the init process
is that when terminated, all the remaining processes in the namespace
are terminated with sigkill. [46]
• User namespace allows the process to have different user and group
id depending on the namespace. Processes may also run with root
privileges which are effective only inside that user namespace. [47]
• UTS namespace provides isolation for the system hostname and NIS
domain name [39].
The guarantees about isolation and self-containment provided by con-
tainers would not be very useful without easy way to manage the containers
on a large scale. Container orchestrators such as Kubernetes[36] and Docker
swarm[15] are designed to solve this exact problem. In addition to the ba-
sic management operations, such as launching and updating the containers,
the orchestrators provide features for centralized management of a cluster
of nodes running containers. Orchestrators in general have following key
capabilities[34].
• cluster state management and scheduling
• providing high availability and fault tolerance
• ensuring security
• simplifying networking
• enabling service discovery
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• making continuous deployment possible
• providing monitoring and governance.
From monitoring point of view orchestrators may both simplify and com-
plicate matters. The orchestrators often provide access to basic container
metrics. However, for example complex networking solutions may compli-
cate network monitor based solutions.
3.1.1 Container networking
There is fundamental need for isolating the networking functions of the con-
tainers. One of the most important reasons is avoiding resource collisions, for
example with ports. Another reason for isolating the networking resources
of containers is the exposure. Another aspect is the security. If the services
are exposed only to the applications that need them, the exposure of any
vulnerability in the services is greatly reduced.
At the core of isolating the networking resources of the containers are
the network namespaces provided by the Linux kernel. Each of the network
namespaces have their own isolated view of the network stack, including
for example the loopback interface and iptables rules. [43] How the network
namespaces are utilized for the containers however depends on the used con-
tainer orchestrator and configuration. As most of the used methods are in one
way or another implemented in the docker ecosystem, it is used as example.
The most common way of isolating the container is using a veth-pair. In
docker, this is referred to as the bridged networking mode. In this mode, each
container is running on its own network namespace. A pair of connected vir-
tual Ethernet interfaces is created, one in the containers network namespace
and the other in the hosts namespace. The host side of the pair is connected
to a bridge which allows the containers to communicate with each other and
the outside world. In docker this bridge is named docker0.
By default, Docker creates a network namespace for each container. This
is however not the only possible approach. The network namespace can as
well be shared with multiple containers. In Docker, this is referred to as the
Container mode. For example, Kubernetes uses this approach to share the
network namespace within the containers belonging to same pod. [24]
Yet another approach is using macvlan. Macvlan allows adding multiple
mac addresses to a single physical interface. Vlan is then used to distinguish
between the subinterfaces. These subinterfaces may then be assigned to dif-
ferent network namespaces, allowing the required isolation for the containers.
the macvlan approach is praised for its performance when compared to the
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veth-pair approach [12][61]. The caveat is that it is not supported by most of
the cloud providers. For example, Docker documentation suggests, that this
approach should only be used for legacy applications, which expect access to
the physical network interface. Furthermore, for example Kubernetes only
supports this mode through third party CNI plugins such as multus-cni [37].
The networking model in Kubernetes is all in all more loosely specified
than in Docker. The networking is based on following fundamentals. [24]
• Containers can communicate with all other containers without NAT.
• Nodes can communicate with all containers (and vice versa) without
NAT.
• The IP a container sees itself is the same IP as others see it.
Kubernetes itself does not itself include the state-of-the-art tools for ful-
filling these requirements, but instead leaves many of the features up to
external implementation [24]. These implementations vary from from simple
overlay networks such as flannel [22] to complex SDNs such as OpenVSwitch
(OVS)[44] [37].
3.2 Kernel Monitoring
Linux kernel provides a wide variety of tools for obtaining information about
running processes and the kernel state. This section introduces the basic
concepts and the methods used for monitoring programs with the Linux
kernel. First, the information sources available and provided by kernel are
discussed. after that tools utilizing these sources are introduced. The eBPF
and Traffic control are discussed in more details due to their relevance for
the implementation part of this thesis.
3.2.1 Static Tracepoints
Static tracepoints are tool for the software developers to leave predetermined
hookable points to the code. Instrumenting important parts of the code can
significantly help tracing the software.
Many popular programs have a number of static tracepoints built in to
their binaries [58]. The most notable example of this is the Linux kernel
itself, which contains over 1500 tracepoints. the traceable kernel events can
be listed with command:
cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/available_events
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Some programs have the static tracepoints but omit them from production
binaries. Usually in these cases the program needs to be recompiled with the
tracepoints before they can be used [58].
On the low level, the tracepoints are implemented as a no-op check fol-
lowed by a conditional jump. When the tracepoint is disabled, the execution
program continues to the instruction after the jump. Enabling of the trace-
point is done by replacing the no-op check in the code. When the check is
false, the program flow jumps to the tracepoint handling. The overhead of a
disabled tracepoint consists of executing the no-op check. This is in practice
considered negligible [3].
The status and the handlers for a tracepoint can be controlled via mul-
tiple different interfaces. Tracepoints can be controlled via debugfs interface
provided by Linux kernel. More common approach however is using tracing
toolkits such as SystemTap [55], LTTng [40] or BCC [5].
3.2.2 Dynamic tracing
Often the static tracepoints may prove insufficient for debugging purpose.
To that extent there is a need for adding dynamic instrumentation in places
where static tracepoints are missing. The Linux kernel provides this function-
ality in the form of Kprobes and Uprobes. Kprobes are method introduced in
Linux kernel to add dynamic breakpoints to nearly any instruction residing
in the kernel code. [33]. Uprobes on the other hand are used to instrument
user space code.
The underlying principle behind the Kprobes is the usage of traps. When
installing the probe, the trapped instruction is copied and replaced with in-
struction sets breakpoint instruction. The instruction is int3 in x86 architec-
ture. When this breakpoint instruction is hit, kernels breakpoint handler is
invoked and the state of currently running process is saved. Control is then
given to the user registered probe function. After the user defined handler
for the probe has returned, the state of interrupted program is restored, and
the replaced instruction is executed. [33][23]
When compared to the other tracing methods executing the Kprobe by
using the trap instruction is considered slow. [33][23] Mainly due to this
considerable overhead, the later versions of the Linux kernel by using jump
instructions instead of the break point instruction to direct the execution flow
to a custom handler. This is referred as ”jump optimization” or ”trampoline”
depending on the document. The jump optimization works by first jumping
to a detour buffer where the execution context is saved to the stack. From
the detour buffer, the execution is passed to the handler function registered
to the probe and after the handler, back to the detour buffer.The detour
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buffer then contains the instructions to restore the previously saved stack
and jump back to the interrupted program. The detour buffer is constructed
when the Kprobe is attached. [33][23]
The jump-based approach yields significantly lower overhead when com-
pared to the trap based approach. There are however limitations for its
usage. For example, the replaced instruction must not include call instruc-
tion or be a target of a jump. The kernel handles the optimizations and falls
back to the trap-based approach if a jump cannot be used.
Uprobes are used in a similar way as the Kprobes. The underlying
working principle is also the same. The biggest difference in usage between
Kprobes and Uprobes is that user has to manually enter the address of the
function traced when using the Uprobes [16]. With Kprobes, the functions
may be referred with their name.
3.2.3 Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF)
Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is a light weight virtual machine-
like construct in the Linux kernel. The eBPF allows bytecode attached from
a process running in the user space to be hooked to certain events occurring
in the kernel. [9] The important factor is that the bytecode itself is run in
the kernel space, as this eliminates the need for passing data and control to
some user mode function for every traced event. This avoids a significant
performance penalty. Especially so if the monitored events are occurring
frequently.
The eBPF programs attached to kernel events may modify handling of
these event inside the kernel. The programs have access to the context of
the event via kernel supplied pointer and furthermore, the return value on
a eBPF program determines an context dependent reaction from the Linux
kernel to the event. For example, in a case of a socket filter program, the
reaction determines whether to forward the packet to the user space or not.
The work flow for an eBPF program is illustrated in the Figure 3.1.
First the eBPF program is written in a subset of C language. Then Clang
and LLVM can be used to compile the program to eBPF bytecode. This
compilation requires Linux kernel sources to be present in the system. The
compiled byte code can be attached to some available hook point in the Linux
kernel. Before the eBPF program is loaded into the kernel it is verified by
static verifier. if the verification passes, the program is then loaded to the
kernel. Often the steps of loading the program to the kernel are done by
a separate user space program which is responsible for extracting the data
from the loaded program as well. Some types of BPF program however can
be attached without an user space counterpart. An example of such would
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be a traffic control filter, which can be loaded directly via the user space
traffic control tool ”tc”.
3.2.3.1 BCC
BCC is a toolkit to streamline the usage of eBPF. It is an open source project
maintained by IOVisor. It provides a python frontend for loading, attaching
and interacting with eBPF programs [5]. The work flow of using BCC to
manage eBPF program is different to what was described above. With BCC,
there is always a user space program controlling the eBPF program. The big
difference between BCC and the traditional work flow is that BCC compiles
the eBPF programs on the fly from the user space program.
3.2.3.2 eBPF Virtual Machine
KernelUser space program Attachable points
eBPF programContext dependent data 
Verifier
eBPF maps
Traffic
Control
Socket
XDP Kprobe
Uprobe
Trace-
point
seccomp more...
Clang/LLVMeBPF
program 
LoadeBPF
bytecode
Statistics & state control
Figure 3.1: eBPF program view. Based on [18]
The eBPF virtual machine includes 11 64bit registers and 512 bytes of
stack space. Furthermore, the size of a program is limited to 4096 instruc-
tions. The instruction set is by design fairly restricted and designed to be
easily mappable to many modern instruction sets, such as x86 or ARM. In the
optimal case eBPF instructions can mostly be mapped to a single instruction
in the underlying architecture.
3.2.3.3 Verification
Before being attached to an event, every eBPF program is verified by an
in-kernel verifier. The verifier guarantees that a the eBPF program will
terminate and that it may not crash. These guarantees are crucial in allowing
user space provided code to be run in the kernel as non-terminating program
run in kernel space would very likely result in a unresponsive system and a
crashing program run in kernel mode will result in a kernel panic.
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The verifier is able to provide such guarantees due to the limitation intro-
duced to the BPF programs. The most important limitation is that no loops
are allowed. This implies that the BPF environment is not Turing complete.
3.2.3.4 Helper functions
Every eBPF program type has their own subset of helper functions available
for use. Some of the functions are very general purpose, such as getting a
processor time, and can be used with nearly any program type. Others are
heavily context dependent. For example, a helper which reads bytes from a
socket buffer only makes sense in a program with networking context.
3.2.4 Licensing
The license used by the eBPF program affects what the program can do.
This is a consequence of the fact that some of the helper functions are GPL
licensed and can thus only be used if the program itself is GPL compatible.
The GPL licensed helpers are mostly related to the perf events provided
by the Linux kernel. The perf related use cases can therefore be heavily
restricted in a commercial use. The licensing of a program is indicated to
the kernel verifier by adding equivalent of a c code line
char ____license[]
__attribute__((section("license"), used)) = "GPL";
to the eBPF program.
3.2.5 Traffic control
Data mirroring and the hook point for the eBPF program are both provided
by the traffic control (TC). As described by Martin Brown [6]:
Traffic control is the name given to the sets of queuing systems
and mechanisms by which packets are received and transmitted
on a router. This includes deciding which (and whether) packets
to accept at what rate on the input of an interface and determin-
ing which packets to transmit in what order at what rate on the
output of an interface.”
In the network processing order of the Linux kernel, the traffic control
resides outside of the network stack. The ingress packets enter the network
stack only after passing through the traffic control. In a similar fashion,
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the egress packets are handled by the traffic control only after leaving the
network stack.
The fundamental component of the traffic control is a queuing discipline,
often referred to as qdisc. A responsibility of a qdisc is to handle enqueuing
and dequeuing packets. An example of a simple qdisc would be just a FIFO
(first-in first-out) queue. A queuing discipline may however use arbitrarily
complex internal mechanics to decide whether to enqueue the packet at all
and in which order to dequeue enqueued packets. Features of the more com-
plex queuing disciplines for example enable policing or prioritizing packets
matching certain classification.
Classes are another important component in the traffic control. Classes
are containers for other TC components, which offer traffic shaping capabili-
ties. A class itself always contains either a single qdisc or multiple classes. as
the queue discipline contained by a class can itself be classful, construction
of complex hierarchies of classes and queue disciplines is possible.
A third central component in the traffic control is filters. Filters can be
attached to classful qdiscs and classes. The purpose of filter is to classify
packets going through its attach point. For example, in a case where a class
attached to a qdisc has multiple child classes, a filter is needed determine
to which child a packet should be assigned. In addition to classifying pack-
ets, filters may take several other actions. These actions include dropping,
marking or triggering a reclassification for a packet. A filter can also decide
to take no action about a packet in which case it is passed to the next filter
attached to same class (or qdisc).
There is distinct hook point for queuing discipline for egress and ingress
traffic of each interface. For egress traffic the top level qdisc is called root.
The root qdisc defaults to qdisc called fast fifo but can be replaced with any
available qdisc. [27] While any qdisc can be assigned as the root qdisc for
egress, the same is not true for the ingress. The top level qdisc for ingress
is just called ingress. The ingress qdisc cannot be replaced and no classes
can be attached to it. Filters can however be attached. This limits the
functionality of the ingress qdisc when compared to the egress ones.
Chapter 4
Kernel monitoring benchmark
This chapter introduces an eBPF based traffic monitor implemented for this
thesis. In addition to the monitor, this chapter describes a test setup to
benchmark the implemented monitor.
4.1 Traffic monitor
In order to determine the performance overhead of an eBPF based traffic
monitor. A simple test monitor is benchmarked against several different types
of test traffic. The purpose of these benchmarks is to find out the overhead
of monitoring very high frequency events purely inside the Linux kernel.
Monitoring network traffic is however a reasonable choice for benchmarkable
use case due to the naturally high frequency of the networking events. Due
to increasing amount of hook points for the eBPF programs in the Linux
kernel and the flexibility of eBPF maps, the possible use cases of eBPF based
monitoring are vastly larger than will be used in the benchmark. The traffic
monitor itself will be an eBPF program, which searches through the traffic
for HTTP status codes. When an error indicating status code is detected
in the traffic, the corresponding TCP stream will be mirrored to a debug
network interface. HTTP was chosen as monitored protocol due to its wide
use as an unified communication protocol between microservices. The eBPF
program itself is inserted to the Linux kernels traffic control subsystem as
a filter. The packets dropped by the filter are then mirrored to the debug
interface by traffic controls mirred-action.
The eBPF monitor, as well as the traffic generators, will be implemented
as a docker containers. the containerized approach was chosen due to its
popularity in microservice implementations.
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4.1.1 Implementation details
The implemented eBPF monitor is composed of two different parts. The first
part of the monitor is the eBPF program, which is attached to the kernel and
is responsible for the actual monitoring. The second part is the user space
program managing the traffic control configuration and attaching the eBPF
program to the kernel.
The implementation was done using BCC tools. As usual in the BCC
workflow, the user space program is done using python and the bindings
provided by the BCC library. The first thing the program does is insert
proper traffic control queue discipline to the monitored interface. This is
done using pythons pyroute2 [49] library, which provides the Linux Iproute2
bindings for the python. At first the BPF program is loaded and compiled
from a file.
from bcc import BPF
from pyroute2 import IPRoute
ip = IPRoute()
bpf = BPF(src_file="bpf_source.c", debug=0)
mirror = bpf.load_func("mirror", BPF.SCHED_CLS)
After the eBPF program is loaded a new dummy interface is created and
enabled.
ip.link('add', ifname='dummy0', kind='dummy')
# lookup the indexes of the used interfaces
dummy = ip.link_lookup(ifname='dummy0')[0]
eth = ip.link_lookup(ifname='eth0')[0]
ip.link('set', index=dummy, state='up')
After the interfaces are configured, the needed queue disciplines (qdisc)
must be added to the interface we want to monitor. To monitor the incoming
traffic, a special qdisc of type ingress is added to the interface. Adding the
qdisc is required since a traffic control filter of any type requires a qdisc class
to be able to be attached and by default the ingress traffic does not have
one. Contrary to the ingress the egress traffic does have a default qdisc. the
default however does not support adding filters, so it is replaced by a qdisc
called Hierarchy Token Bucket (HTB) which has the support.
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ip.tc('add', kind='ingress', index=eth, handle='ffff:')
ip.tc('add', kind='htb', index=eth, handle='1:')
When the proper qdiscs are in place, it is possible to add the eBPF filters.
The mirror action parameters shown below specify that the mirrored packets
should appear as egress packets on the interface dummy. The eBPF program
itself is passed to the traffic control via the file descriptor available through
previously used eBPF load func command.
# define the mirror action used in filters below
mirror_action = [{
'kind': 'mirred', 'direction': 'egress',
'action': 'mirror', 'ifindex': dummy
}]
# Add the ingress filter
ip.tc(
'add-filter', kind='bpf',
index=eth, handle=':1',
name=mirror.name, fd=mirror.fd,
parent='ffff:', action=mirror_action
)
# Add the egress filter
ip.tc(
'add-filter', kind='bpf',
index=eth, handle=':1',
name=mirror.name, fd=mirror.fd,
parent='1:', action=mirror_action
)
The filtering logic of the eBPF program is illustrated in the Figure 4.1.
The program first scans through the Ethernet, IP and TCP headers and in
each case, quits early if the protocol is wrong. in the case the packet is indeed
a TCP packet, its source and destination IP address and port are looked up in
the map of traced connections. If a match is found from the map the packet is
immediately destined to be mirrored. Otherwise the beginning of the packet
is searched for the beginning of a HTTP response and if found, the status
code is read as well. For testing purposes, the status code is 500, indicating
a server error, was selected as a trigger for mirroring the connection. when
trigger is found, the connection is added to the map of traced connections
and the packet is classified for mirroring. With any other status code, the
packet is just passed through normally.
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Figure 4.1: Tracer classification logic
The connection map is implemented using a least recently used hash
map. This means that least recently active connections will be dropped in
case the the maximum number of traced connections is exceeded. In a pro-
duction grade monitor, more sophisticated solution would be recommended
for removing inactive connections. However for testing purposes, the least
recently used map provided a simple solution. The key used in the hash map
to identify connection is following C language struct.
struct ConnectionInfo {
uint32_t src_ip;
uint32_t dst_ip;
uint16_t src_port;
uint16_t dst_port;
};
The value of inserted into the map is not relevant to the function of the
monitor. In a more advanced version however it could be used as a timestamp
to timeout the tracing of a connection if no further trigger event have not
occurred.
the eBPF program may return one of two different return values de-
pending on the desired outcome. To just pass the packet through, the
program returns TC ACT OK. For mirroring the relevant return value is
TC ACT SHOT which is in general used to drop the packets. The mirroring
is then implemented as action for the packets dropped by the eBPF filter,
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which results in the desired behaviour. All possible return values are defined
in the Linux kernel header ”pkt cls.h” [45].
Kernel
Traffic control
User space 
Linux host
Qdisc ingress (cap IF) Qdisc egress (cap IF)
Network stack
Action
pass 
Action
mirred eBPF filter
Qdisc egress (fwd IF)
eBPF filter Actionmirred 
Action
pass 
Ingress traffic Egress traffic
Application
Socket
Remote 
Monitor
Figure 4.2: Networking view of the tracer architecture
4.1.2 Containerization and host requirements
The monitor was built to be run in a Docker image. This introduces chal-
lenges for running the monitor. The reason for this is that by default, Docker
restricts some of the features of Linux kernel which are required by the eBPF
monitor. The additional flags and configurations to run the monitor were im-
plemented to be equal to following docker command.
docker run \
--network host \
--cap-add NET_ADMIN \
--cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
-v /lib/modules:/lib/modules \
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-v /usr/src/:/usr/src \
monitor_image_name
The option ’–network host’ is needed due to the network namespacing.
By default, each container will be in their own network namespace which
is undesirable for the monitor as it is unable to see the traffic necessary for
its function. the line in question assigns the container directly to the host
network namespace.
The ’–cap-add’ flags give the container the capabilities CAP NET ADMIN
and CAP SYS ADMIN. [7] The CAP NET ADMIN is required by the mon-
itoring to be able to insert the eBPF program to the traffic control. The
CAP SYS ADMIN is instead required for the monitor be allowed to access
the required eBPF maps for storing the connection information.
Compiling eBPF programs requires the sources of the kernel version run-
ning on the host system. The sources are therefore mounted from the host
system with ”-v” flags. /usr/src directory is the actual location of the kernel
sources. /lib/modules directory has to be mounted to the container as well
due to there being a symbolic link to a subfolder in /usr/src which the BCC
tools is using to access the headers.
4.1.3 Limitations
The most important limitation of the implemented monitor is that only the
start of each packet is scanned for the start of an HTTP response. Further-
more, it is assumed that the first 10 bytes of the headers are contained in the
same packet. Neither of these conditions are necessarily true. As TCP is a
purely stream oriented protocol. A client could send the header very slowly,
even one byte at time. This would mean that the monitor, expecting at least
10 bytes, would never correctly parse a such request. In addition, HTTP
requests may be pipelined by a sender which means that a start of an HTTP
header may be in a middle of a TCP packet after a previous request. In these
cases, the eBPF monitor would simply miss the trigger for mirroring.
In practice it was found out that even with request pipelining most of the
first bytes of the headers did indeed end up being at the start of a TCP packet.
This is most likely due to each request being sent with separate system call
allowing the delay between the calls to cause a flush in the underlying buffer.
The case of really slow sending of TCP packets where the first 10 bytes
would not end up in the same packet is extremely unlikely to occur outside
of a purposely adversarial scenario.
Further limitation is that the implemented monitor supports only the 1.0
and 1.1 versions of HTTP and IP version 4. IP version 6 support would be
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a trivial addition but was deemed unnecessary for the testing purposes.
4.1.4 Metrofunnel, Reference monitor
Metrofunnel is a Restful request monitor based on capturing the HTTP traf-
fic with libpcap [28]. Metrofunnel was chosen as an alternative monitor for
the benchmark due to the fact that, its use case greatly resembles the im-
plemented eBPF monitor. The main difference in the use is that instead of
mirroring the network data, Metrofunnel keeps track of alive requests and
measures the delay and the result. [11] The purpose of using alternative
monitor is to compare eBPF results with a monitor for which there exists
results in the literature.
4.2 Test setup
The implemented monitor is benchmarked with two different traffic patterns
and two different host configurations. The first of the two is the Iperf3
bandwidth benchmarking tool. The purpose of using Iperf3 is to flood an
interface with as much traffic as the interface can take and measure the
difference in obtained bandwidth in a case where the monitor is present and
in a case where it is not. Even though the mirroring mechanism is not tested
at all by this load, the test with Iperf3 will show the impact of the monitors
presence when a maximum number of packets is put through the monitored
network interface.
Another used traffic pattern is a flood of small HTTP requests. This
traffic pattern is generated by using two different tools. Nginx is used as the
HTTP server due to its high performance. Furthermore, it is an industry
standard for example as a HTTP proxy. h2load utility from HTTP2 library
Nghttp2 is used as a HTTP client for the test. As with the Iperf3, the
throughput of the traffic is measured with and without the monitor. This
time however, varying amount of the traffic is mirrored through another
interface.
Both traffic patterns will be tested in two different environments. The
first environment is a single host server which runs both the traffic generators
and the monitor. As the traffic goes through the loopback interface. It is to
be expected that the setup is solely bound by processor or possibly memory
speed. The scenario is not unrealistic because in a microservice architecture,
there often is multiple services running on a single host which is part of a
larger cluster.
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The other environment is a multi-host environment. The environment
contains two hosts, one of which is running the traffic generator client and
the other will be running the traffic generator server. Both hosts are run-
ning their own instance of the monitor. Results obtained for the monitoring
overhead in this environment should more closely match the overhead in a
real microservice environment than with the single host.
4.2.1 Iperf3
Iperf3 [30] is a bandwidth measurement tool used in this research to measure
TCP throughput. With the Iperf3 based test load, both the client and the
server are running Iperf3. In both of the cases, a Iperf3 was ran on a Debian
9 based container provided at Dockerhub by name networkstatic/iperf3 [29].
The Iperf version used was 3.0.7. The test setup the server was run without
any notable changes to configuration with following options.
iperf3 -s -B 0.0.0.0
The client in turn was started with following command:
iperf3 -i 1 -t 60 -J -Z -O 10 -c <ip address>
Option Explanation
-i 1 Aggregate the statistics in one second intervals
-J JSON output
-T 60 Duration in seconds
-Z Zero copy mode for sending the data.
-O 10 Omit the first 10 seconds of the test
-c <ip address> Client mode. Connect to the specified address
Table 4.1: Used Iperf3 client options [31]
The meaning of the options used above are explained in the table 4.1.
The reason for using the zero copy mode is to maximize the throughput of
the load generator and thus highlight overhead imposed by the monitor.
4.2.2 Nghttp2 and Nginx
In addition to the traffic generated with Iperf3, a combination of Nghttp2
and Nginx was used to generate HTTP traffic to test the monitor with load
it is intended to parse. On the server side, Nginx was configured to respond
to two different urls with following configuration.
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location /foo {
return 200 'foofoofoofoofoofoo';
}
location /bar {
return 500 'bar';
}
The functionality of the two urls differs only on the response code sent
and the length of the payload. One sends a 200 response implying a successful
response and the other 500 indicating an internal server error. To maximize
the performance, the payloads are short and are returned directly instead of
reading from a file. The longer payload for the 200 response is to compen-
sate the slightly longer response header in the error response. Namely in the
first header line there is ”Internal Server Error” instead of ”OK”. With the
payload shown in the configuration above, the TCP payload length is same
regardless of the queried url. In addition to the above urls, Nginx configura-
tion was altered with following settings: Amount of worker connections was
set to 8192, the number of worker processes was set to 2 and the number of
keep alive requests was set to 10000.
On the client side, h2load tool from Nghttp2 library was used to generate
http requests to the Nginx.
h2load -D 60 -c 10, -m 1 -N 15 -T 15 --h1 <URL>
Option Explanation
-D 60 Duration in seconds
-c 10 The number of clients to use
-m 1 the maximum number of pipelined requests
-N 15 Active connection timeout in seconds
-T 15 Connection inactivity timeout in seconds
- -h1 Use HTTP version 1.1
<URL> The URL to send the requests to
Table 4.2: Used h2load parameters
An example of a single generated HTTP request used in the benchmarks
has 78 bytes TCP payload and is shown below.
GET /bar HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8888
user-agent: h2load nghttp2/1.34.0
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In turn a single response has a 183 bytes TCP payload.
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: nginx/1.15.7
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 07:32:48 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 3
Connection: keep-alive
bar
4.2.3 Single host configuration
Memory 8Gb DDR3 1600MT/s SODIMM
CPU Model Intel Core i7-3740QM 2.70GHz
CPUs 8
Threads per core 2
L1i cache 32K
L1d cache 32K
L2 cache 256K
L3 cache 6144K
Table 4.3: Hardware
In the single host configurations all of the containers included in the
benchmark were accommodated in a single computer. The network traffic
in a single host configuration is going solely through the loopback interface.
While the interaction of the monitor with container networking is a relevant
topic in this research, the benchmarks aim for the greatest stress to the
monitor. The container networking is thus omitted from the benchmarking.
The container networking considerations to the monitor are detailed in the
section 3.1.1.
The the single host configuration was run with Fedora 29 operating sys-
tem running Linux kernel version 4.18.16-300. The hardware specification is
described in detail in the table 4.3.
To reduce jitter in the results, intel pstate was disabled. intel pstate is
a Linux kernel driver which controls the CPU frequency. The driver adapts
the used frequency on the fly based on the load. The changes in frequency
in turn causes jitter to the benchmarks. The disabling was done by adding
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the line ”intel pstate=disable” to a file ”/etc/default/grub”. After that the
grub configuration had to be updated and the machine rebooted.
Disabling the intel pstate causes linux to use acpi-cpufreq driver to control
which in the experiments was configured to use static 2.7GHz frequency.
4.2.4 Multi-host configuration
The Multi-host setup is built on two servers connected via 10G fiber con-
nection. The hardware specification is described in the table 4.4. As with
the single host configuration, the operating system running on the servers
was Fedora 29. The running Linux kernel on the other hand was 4.20.16-
200.fc29.x86 64, which is a few versions newer than the one used the single
host configuration.
To simulate a busy containerized environment, the amount of running
benchmarking instances were scaled up for the HTTP benchmark. Instead
of the 5 h2load instances running on a single core, 48 instances were used
spanning to all of the 48 cores of the server. The Nginx was scaled up
respectively to a total of 48 worker processes. The total amount of monitors
running was also raised to two. One for each of the host servers. This reflects
the single host test in the sense that each of the packets hits a monitor twice.
The test setup was modified so that instead of 5 runs for different portion
of mirrored traffic, there was only 3. Therefore, the tests were run for 0%,
50% and 100% of data mirrored.
The monitor itself was modified to use cpu local lru-caches for connection
storing instead the stock lru-caches. The reason for this modification is
excluding the overhead of the synchronization of the maps from the results.
Memory 126 Gb DDR4 2133 MT/s DIMM
CPU Model Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 v3 @ 2.50GHz
CPUs 48
Threads per core 2
L1i cache 32K
L1d cache 32K
L2 cache 256K
L3 cache 30720K
Table 4.4: Multi host Hardware
Chapter 5
Evaluation
This chapter presents the results of benchmarks described in the previous
chapter. First the results with single host configuration are presented and an-
alyzed. Then a similar presentation is done for the multi-host configuration.
Finally this chapter presents experimentation with the test configurations
based on the results obtained.
5.1 Single Host results
The single host benchmarks were conducted in three different configurations.
The first is the non-monitored reference run. In graphs and tables this is
referred to as the ”untraced” benchmark. The second is the benchmark with
the eBPF monitor in place. This is referred to the ”traced” benchmark.
The third configuration is referred to as ”TC only”. In this configuration,
the queuing disciplines required to attach the eBPF filter were installed.
However, the eBPF filter itself was not.
5.1.1 TCP throughput
The impact of the monitor to the TCP throughput was measured using the
Iperf3 tool. For one test run the tool was run two times for 60 seconds,
once with the monitor and once without. To reduce noise the results were
averaged with a total of 801 runs of the same test. The averaged data for
the throughput is shown in the table 5.1. The benchmarks show roughly a
10% lower TCP throughput with the monitor than without. The monitor
has three parts which may affect the throughput. The HTB queuing disci-
pline attached to the egress, the bpf filter itself, and the user space monitor
program. The impact of the user space program should be minimal as it
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is sleeping in 1 second interval during the test. The overhead of using the
queuing disciplines which support filters at all amount to a quarter of the
penalty in the throughput. The other three quarters can be attributed to
the eBPF filter itself.
Untraced Qdiscs only Traced
Average throughput 28.9 GBit/s 28.2 GBit/s 25.9 GBit/s
Standard deviation 0.26 GBit/s 0.31 GBit/s 0.76 GBit/s
Percent of untraced 100% 97.7% 89.7%
Table 5.1: Throughput test summary
5.1.2 HTTP
The results for the benchmark with HTTP traffic payload yield information
about the impact of the monitor to the HTTP-request throughput and delay.
Due to high amount jitter in the results, the values presented in this section
are medians of the corresponding metrics. The median is taken from a total
of 801 runs. As an example, the mean throughput is therefore the median of
the means calculated for each run.
The HTTP throughput is plotted as a function of the error request
percentage in the Figure 5.1. The presumption for the results is that the
throughput of non-monitored and qdisc only versions is not affected at all by
the percentage of the error request. The presumption for the monitored ver-
sion is that the throughput decreases as the percentage of the error request
increases. The basis for this presumption is that mirroring of the request has
non-zero overhead. That overhead should increase as the percentage of error
request and therefore mirrored data increases.
As per the presumptions, the HTTP throughput of the monitored traf-
fic load indeed dropped in seemingly linear fashion from 97% of the non-
monitored throughput to 89%. The results from raw TCP throughput bench-
mark would suggest that the benchmark with only the queuing disciplines
in place should result in decreased throughput when compared to the non-
monitored benchmark. however, this was not observed.
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Percentile 50 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 99.9999
untraced 0.154 0.200 18 32 46 57 66
tc only 0.156 0.207 19 33 47 57 207
traced 0.164 0.226 19 33 48 57 207
Table 5.2: HTTP request time (ms) percentiles with 0% errors
The request percentiles in the tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that all meaningful
differences in the request times happen before the 99.9th percentile regardless
of the request error rate. The difference between the 99.9th percentiles with
100% error rate is at most 3%. The smaller percentiles are however affected
by the monitoring and the error rate. Without any errors the median request
time increases by 6% when the monitoring is introduced. With errors the
same increase is 13%. The 99.9999 percentiles show a significant increase in
delay for the tc only and traced benchmarks. This seems to be connected to
the HTB queuing discipline used. However, the exact reason is unknown.
Percentile 50 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 99.9999
untraced 0.154 0.200 18 32 47 57 65
tc only 0.156 0.207 19 33 48 57 207
traced 0.174 0.244 20 33 47 57 206
Table 5.3: HTTP request time (ms) percentiles with 100% errors
5.2 Multi-host results
The Multi-host benchmarks were conducted in four different configurations.
The ”traced” and ”untraced” configurations match their counterparts de-
scribed in the single host configuration. The ”funnel” represents configu-
ration where the Metrofunnel was used for network monitoring instead of
the eBPF monitor. In the fourth configuration the eBPF monitor used is
identical to the one used in the traced configuration. However instead of
mirroring, the filter will just pass the packets to the network stack without
further action. This configuration is referred in tables and figures as ”pass”.
5.2.1 TCP throughput
The results for TCP throughput are presented in the table 5.4. The results
presented are averaged between 70 runs of the Iperf3 benchmark. Due to the
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fact that a single core used for generating the traffic is able to saturate the
10G NIC, the results are uneventful. When the computing is transformed
from CPU bound to network bound, the overhead of monitoring vanishes
completely.
Average throughput Standard deviation
Untraced 8.768 GBit/s 0.003 GBit/s
Traced 8.768 GBit/s 0.003 GBit/s
Table 5.4: Multi-host TCP throughput test summary
5.2.2 HTTP
The results of the HTTP throughput are presented in the figure 5.4.The
HTTP throughput measured with the monitor with drops to 30% of the non-
monitored reference without mirroring enabled. 100% mirroring causes the
throughput drop even further to 20% of the reference. This is a drastic drop
when compared to the 10% overhead measured in single host benchmark.
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Percentile 50 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 99.9999
untraced 0.262 0.378 0.578 1 14 23 36
funnel 0.304 0.527 0.930 19 31 45 61
pass 0.877 1 2 4 5 6 13
traced 0.886 1 3 4 4 6 12
Table 5.5: HTTP request time (ms) percentiles with 0% errors
The with the overhead of mirroring is visible in the delays as well. The
request delays for the 99.9 - 99.999 percentiles are greater for the mirrored
requests than the monitored requests without mirroring. However, the ad-
ditional overhead from mirroring is small when compared to the overhead of
the monitoring itself.
Percentile 50 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 99.9999
untraced 0.266 0.374 0.562 0.977 15 23 36
funnel 0.300 0.530 0.971 18 30 45 61
pass 0.897 1 3 4 4 6 14
traced 1 2 4 7 9 10 15
Table 5.6: HTTP request time (ms) percentiles with 100% errors
5.3 Experimentation
Due to the large performance degradation caused by the eBPF monitor with
the multi-host setup, additional experimentation was done identify the roots
of the sudden increase in the overhead. The aim for these measurements
were to identify the relationship of between the monitoring overhead and
used CPUs.
The experimentation used exactly the same traffic loads and monitor,
however the amount of CPU cores available to the traffic generators was
varied. The results for these measurements are shown in the Figure 5.8 and
5.9. The results are a median from 30 independent runs of the same test.
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Discussion
This chapter discusses the relationship of the Linux kernel based microservice
monitoring and existing solutions for microservice monitoring. Furthermore,
problems regarding the kernel based monitoring, their solutions and future
tidings are discussed.
6.1 Performance
The results for performance overhead of the implemented eBPF monitor are
mixed at best. The performance impact of at most 10% for throughput and
negligible impact on delay are promising. However, the multi-host test setup
introduced a grave performance degradation to the HTTP benchmark. The
throughput was down to the 30% and the impact on delay significantly larger
than with the single host setup. The characteristics of the results suggests
that the eBPF monitor hit a hard performance bottleneck when 12 cores or
more were in use. This effectively prevented any additional processors or
HTTP client from positively contributing to the HTTP throughput. The
non-monitored setup however did not suffer from this bottleneck.
Even though the underlying reason for the bottleneck was not identified,
just the presence of the bottleneck has implications regarding the use case
of a containerized monitor. An integral part of the use case is that the
containerized monitor should work predictably and the same way regardless
of the host environment. It is clear, that using traffic control and eBPF
for monitoring can have unpredictable host specific side effects. These side
effects could likely be mitigated by careful configuration of the host. This
host specific configuration however is again in direct contradiction of the use
case of a host independent monitoring container.
As a summary for the performance, the eBPF monitor has very low over-
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head in the best-case scenario. However reliably achieving the best-case
scenario in the context of a containerized monitor might not currently be
possible without host specific configuration.
6.2 Complexity of the monitor
It has to be noted that the implemented monitor represented the simpler
end of eBPF programs. It is likely that a production grade version would
exceed this test implementation both in features and complexity. With the
additional complexity for the monitor, it should be expected that the over-
head will slightly increase as well. However, the production grade monitor
is expected to be far further optimized than the monitor used in the test
implementation. For example replacing the generic maps with per-cpu maps
and IRQ-pinning should improve performance. Furthermore, the single host
use case could have been optimized to only capture from either the ingress
or egress instead of both, effectively halving the overhead.
6.3 Monitored interfaces
The problem of choosing the monitored interfaces in the hosts is all but trivial
and depends on the container networking solution used. the problem is best
illustrated using two containers residing in the same local docker network. In
this case, there is three statically configured interfaces to which the monitor
could be attached. First is the outgoing Ethernet interface. the second is the
Docker0 bridge and the third is the bridge of the internal docker network.
An eBPF monitor attached to any of these is unable see the traffic between
the two containers. In the case of the internal docker network bridge this is
unexpected. This is due to the fact that for example libpcap based solutions
are able capture the traffic while traffic control filter cannot.
The end result of this is that effectively only place to get both internal and
outgoing traffic is attaching the monitor to the virtual Ethernet interfaces.
This solution is not without problems either. Firstly, an instance of the
monitor has to be created every time a container is launched, while this
can be done, it adds to the complexity of the monitoring solution. The
other problem is that again, the local traffic which in optimal case would
only be captured once, is necessarily captured on both ends. These specific
complications cannot as such be generalized outside dockers implementation
of the networking. There is however no reason to expect that the problem of
choosing the captured network interfaces would be easier with other container
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networking implementations.
6.4 Comparison to existing tools
6.4.1 Network Monitoring
This section compares the eBPF based solution to a hypothetical implemen-
tation constructed using older and more tested tools. To be able to reason-
ably compare the implementations, a set of feasibility criteria is needed. The
most important criteria is arguably the performance impact. Other criteria
to consider are flexibility, maintainability and quality. In the scope of the
comparison, flexibility is defined as the ability of a single solution to be ex-
tended into multiple monitoring related use cases. Maintainability on the
other hand is in this scope used to refer how easy the solution is to imple-
ment or change in general. Quality refers here to the extent that the solution
fulfills its use case.
As a rule of thumb, most of the use cases for the eBPF could be im-
plemented with more tested tools or with a combination of them. However
usually a compromise regarding one or more of aforementioned criteria is
required. For example, the selective network mirroring based on the HTTP
error detection could have been implemented with libpcap or the standard
tools using libpcap such as tcpdump or wireshark.
Let us first consider an implementation where the performance of the
libpcap solution is required to match the eBPF monitor. It is possible to
construct libpcap filter matching the HTTP headers in a similar fashion as
the eBPF program. This is due to the fact that the filters of libpcap use
cBPF which is the older and more limited variant of eBPF, which is now
implicitly converted to eBPF by the Linux Kernel. Due to the limitations
of cBPF, the filter is however not able to use maps to maintain state. This
means that the list of mirrored connections needs to be maintained by user
space program instead of the kernel. The mirroring cannot be done with the
in-kernel cBPF filter installed by libpcap either, as the filter may only decide
whether to forward a packet to user space or not. Mirroring in this use case
could be handled by manually wrapping the data in user space and sending
it forward. An alternative would be to manage the mirrored connections by
adding a mirroring rule to iptables, or traffic control from user space for each
mirrored connection.
The major quality issue with the manual wrapping of data obtained from
libpcap is the stateless nature of cBPF filter. To obtain the packets following
the error the filter has to be modified to include the rules for the mirrored
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connection or a new filter must be added. At this point all of the presented
solutions require adding some configuration to the kernel either get the data
to user space or to directly mirror it somewhere. The problem itself is that
adding the rules to the kernel is slow regardless of whether libpcap, traffic
control or iptables is configured from user space. It is very likely that most of
the relevant follow up for the error has already passed before the new config-
uration is in effect, which is a huge downgrade in quality when compared to
the eBPF filter. In conclusion, any libpcap based solution aiming to compete
with performance of the eBPF will have to resort to manipulating the kernel
tool configurations which will result in a significant quality degradation. In
addition to the quality, the maintainability and flexibility of the solutions
described above cannot really compete with the eBPF based solution.
The only conceivable way or matching the quality and the maintainability
of the best case of the eBPF monitor would be to just capture all TCP traffic
with libpcap and then do the filtering and mirroring of the data in user space.
Most of the existing libpcap based implementations indeed seem to resort to
this approach using at most very coarse static filters and doing the rest of
the processing in user space. [42][4][17][38][11]
Due to the overhead of copying packets to the user space which the per-
formance overhead of should be greater than measured for the eBPF monitor.
The results obtained from the single host benchmarks indeed support this,
as the difference in HTTP throughput was a maximum of 10% overhead
against the 50% for the Metrofunnel. The multi-host benchmark however
demonstrated that there are configurations on which the performance of the
eBPF monitor is so far from optimal, that a libpcap based solution, such
as Metrofunnel [28], may easily outperform it. Overhead larger than 70% is
highly unusual when compared to the existing literature. Even monitoring
packet data with eBPF by tcpsend function with a Kprobe, which should be
much more costly, has been done for large packets with only 50% performance
overhead [13].
6.4.2 Microservice monitoring
Most of the tools currently used to monitor microservices do not use the
network monitoring approach, but instead rely instrumenting the application
or indirect data collection methods for the monitoring.
It is hard for the eBPF monitor to compete with existing tools at the
performance overhead or the quality of data. The monitoring tools instru-
menting the applications have access to the full context of any error occur-
ring whereas, the eBPF monitor must keep track of any context it requires
to function. Furthermore, for the eBPF monitor in networking context, the
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base of cost is measured per packet, whereas by application instrumentation
the cost is at most per request. The lower overhead combined with easier
access to context ensure, that it is hard to advocate using eBPF monitor
in cases where components used are supported by the already production
grade tools. To further show the immaturity of eBPF, recently there was
discovered a bug where eBPF would give wrong result on something as basic
as subtract operation [19].
The eBPF monitor is not able nor meant to be a replacement for the
existing solutions. Integrating parts of the monitor as data sources to exist-
ing tools could provide useful metrics without the cost of building a whole
new monitoring solution. An example solution for this would be outputting
statistics aggregated via eBPF program as metrics to Prometheus.
Another possible target for integration is Cilium [10]. Cilium is an appli-
cation firewall and overlay network, which is implemented on top of eBPF.
The eBPF based implementation could yield synergy between the imple-
mentations for example with shared eBPF maps. This is especially true for
solutions already utilizing Cilium for example as the overlay network for a
Kubernetes implementation.
6.5 Containerization and Security implications
From the dependency perspective the monitoring implementation was suc-
cessful. The only unavoidable dependency to the host system of the monitor
is sufficiently new kernel version to support the eBPF used. Kernel sources
and headers required to run eBPF can to some extent be shipped with the
container image. In the end, the capabilities of the host system determine
the reasonable approach considering the kernel sources. Including the kernel
headers in the for all used kernel versions in the monitors container image
can definitely be done as long as the used versions are well known. This how-
ever complicates the image usage as keeping the headers up to date with the
used kernel versions is a non-trivial task. In any use case where the sources
can be mounted to the image from the host system, it is likely the better
option. Despite being more attractive option than the alternatives, mounting
the sources from the host is not perfect solution either. At least Fedora 29
removes the older sources while updating kernel version. The running kernel
on the other hand, is only updated at the next system restart. This leaves a
period where necessary sources for eBPF program compilation are not found
in the system.
From the security point of view, the isolation of the monitor was not
very successful. Even the networking context required SYS ADMIN and
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NET ADMIN to be given to the monitor container. The SYS ADMIN capa-
bility alone indicates that the container should be in practice considered as
running with full root access. If other hook points for eBPF such as kprobes
or uprobes are to be used, additional debugfs mounts and possibly access to
the hosts process namespace are required. For example, in a use case where
an Uprobe needs to be inserted in to an executable inside another container,
access to the root file system of the monitored process is required.
It is important to highlight that tweaking security profiles with SELinux [53]
or AppArmor [2] was not included in the scope of this thesis. These tools
are important part of securing privileged containers [25]. While these tools
can be used for implementing incredibly fine-grained policies and rules, using
them to secure the monitor is hard. In the best case the ruleset for the access
control requires constant maintenance and even that might not be enough.
This is because any capability required for the monitor to function might
at the same time compromise the container sandbox. The eBPF itself is a
good example of this. Even the ability just to run arbitrary eBPF programs
can be enough to compromise the system. One such way is a consequence
of the fact that many tracing related bpf programs may write to arbitrary
user space memory addresses using user probe write function. This has been
shown to enable privilege escalation attacks [14].
6.6 Future research
6.6.1 eBPF offloading
eBPF offloading refers to outsourcing the execution of the eBPF programs
away from the CPU. Offloading the traffic control decision making and the
related eBPF programs to the NIC could allow for drastically reduced impact
for processing overhead. The support for transparently offloading TC eBPF
programs is already present in the Linux kernel. However currently only the
smart NICs produced by Netronome support the offloading [35].
Considering the monitor proposed in this thesis, the offloading could help
to scale the monitor for higher speeds and mitigate some of the issues en-
countered with the highly parallel traffic loads. Due to the lacking support
and poor maturity, the offloading is not yet viable approach to be considered.
6.6.2 Alternative triggers and actions
The triggers and actions implemented to the monitor represented a minor
subset of possible interactions. The only implemented action was the traffic
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 49
mirroring and the only trigger was error codes found in HTTP requests. The
connection between the trigger and action was an eBPF map keeping track of
which connections to mirror. The error requests or even network monitoring
are however by no means only possible triggers. An eBPF map may be shared
with other eBPF programs with different contexts or user space programs.
In the networking context, alternative trigger could be a probe triggering
at certain probability at new TCP connections, effectively working as a TCP
connection sampler. Outside the networking context, the instrumentation
with Kernel or user space probes could provide possible triggers. Without
access to the networking context however the triggering events must be pos-
sible to correlate with the corresponding network traffic.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, monitoring 5G microservices with Linux kernel was researched
through the use case of an eBPF based network monitor. Both the tooling for
microservice monitoring and Linux kernel are actively improved independent
of each other.
The eBPF benchmarks show that from performance point of view, the
eBPF has potential to allow flexible monitoring with negligible performance
impact. However, utilizing eBPF reliably to that extent proved to be a
non-trivial task. The benchmark results for multi host setup showed HTTP
throughput decrease below 30% due to the presence of an eBPF monitor.
This was shown to be linked to the number of cores used for the benchmark,
while the exact reason could not be identified. However, this significant
inconsistency in the overhead, which depends on the used hardware and
configuration, confirms that unless an effort is made to configure the host
server and the monitor for optimal settings, the lowest overheads will not be
achieved consistently.
One of the main reasons for running services in containers is the promise
of similar behavior regardless of the host environment. The inconsistency
in performance, depending on the capabilities of the host server, makes the
eBPF monitor less than ideal use case for containerized application.
When compared to the existing tools for microservice monitoring, the ad-
vantages provided by eBPF monitor are at best questionable. The low-level
monitoring is problematic due to the fact that the context of events tend to
be harder to access. The existing tools most often resort to instrumenting
the service applications or indirect monitoring, such as log analysis. Instru-
menting the application has the advantage of of having the full context of
the service available for the monitor. Furthermore, the performance over-
head is low and consistent between the environments, as the application or
instrumentation framework is responsible the monitoring.
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The development of the eBPF in the Linux kernel is not complete. New
features are constantly introduced and old ones improved. Furthermore,
many of existing tools, which from performance point of view would benefit
from eBPF, is not yet adapted to use it. The awareness of containers in
the operating system level monitoring tools is in a similar situation. As the
awareness for containers and utilization of eBPF for existing tools improves,
it is to be expected that kernel level monitoring of microservices will become
more viable option than it is now.
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